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Abstract/Foreword
Before introducing the material of this thesis, I must warn the reader of its incompleteness.
It is a work-in-progress, the beginnings of a manuscript detailing ideas still not fully worked out
in my own understanding. It seems that in taking on this project, I stumbled across a book’s worth
of ideas and tried to record them all in the span of two semesters. Unraveling the mysteries of my
mind at this pace made for exciting discovery, but just as mysterious and often inscrutable writing.
Many of my descriptions take as given the theories of consciousness laid out by the Yale
and Princeton psychological researcher Julian Jaynes in his 1976 book The Origin of
Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. It was this fantastical 500-page book that
made me so thoroughly question the substrate of my thought. In it, Jaynes tells a compelling yet
almost ridiculous story of how consciousness may have originated as late as the second millennium
BCE in Ancient Greece. Whether or not this wild historical interpretation is fact or fiction, the
important implications of his theory, I believe, lie elsewhere. That consciousness as we know it is
not required for complex cognitive thought, and that through metaphor we create ourselves in
consciousness as analog, narratized beings—these arguments are what I find profound and what I
wish to explore.
I begin by addressing the problem of consciousness, and quickly veer off to explain what
consciousness is not, namely, experience. Before returning to define consciousness in its
prominent features and functions, I explain the metaphorical methods we use to understand the
world and by which we create consciousness. Finally, I extend Jaynes’s theory of consciousness
and explore some of its prominent implications, such as the ultimatum that arises between the
acceptance of either a metaphysical conception of self or a denial of the self beyond simulation.
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Over the course of my introspective investigations thus far (which began well before this thesis
was conceived), I have come to subscribe (rather optimistically) to the latter view.
Many of my ideas I expound in still undeveloped essays, the writing of which is very rough.
Take them with a grain of salt; they are merely the ramblings of my thought and tumblings of my
mind as I tried to wrap it around the idea of our absolute construction of consciousness. In trying
to think of consciousness in this way, I found myself continually slipping back into the narratives
of identity I tell myself I am, which made for difficult writing, but also comforted in the freedom
of the limitless and arbitrariness of conscious construction.

Clarke 5
I. Introduction
“O, what a world of unseen visions and heard silences, this insubstantial country of the
mind! What ineffable essences, these touchless rememberings and unshowable reveries!
And the privacy of it all! A secret theater of speechless monologue and prevenient counsel,
an invisible mansion of all moods, musings, and mysteries, and infinite resort of
disappointments and discoveries. A whole kingdom where each of us reigns reclusively
alone, questioning what we will, commanding what we can. A hidden hermitage where we
may study out the troubled book of what we have done and yet may do. An introcosm that
is more myself than anything I can find in a mirror. This consciousness that is myself of
selves, that is everything, and yet nothing at all — what is it?
And where did it come from?
And why?” (Jaynes 1)

The Problem of Consciousness
“When asked the question, what is consciousness? we become conscious of consciousness.
And most of us take this consciousness of consciousness to be what consciousness is. This
is not true” (Jaynes 21).
Consciousness is not all that we make it out to be. Thinking, planning, wanting, hoping—
these functions, among others, form the basis of human cognition and are often seen as the pinnacle
of what it means to be human. However, many of these processes do not require consciousness
and are, in fact, often hindered by its presence.
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II. The Experience of Being
We as human beings, like other living creatures, have an experience of what it is like to
exist and to perceive the world around us. As we consciously experience the world through our
perceptions and introspect upon our experiences, we must face the inevitable question of what it
means to be conscious. I shall soon elaborate Jaynes’s model of consciousness as a cognitive
operation whereby we create a metaphorical internal mind-space in which an analog self
manipulates spatialized thoughts. On the way, I shall extend his theoretical conceptions of
consciousness by overlaying my own. But before we can understand the uniqueness of human
consciousness, we must briefly examine another conception, phenomenal consciousness, which
defines consciousness as simply a mode of experience.

Phenomenal Consciousness
“There is ‘something-it-is-like’ for bats to perceive the world just as there is ‘somethingit-is-like’ for dolphins, cats, and humans to perceive the world. Unfortunately, there is no
consensus on how to understand or define this mysterious concept of ‘what-it-is-likeness,’
otherwise known as ‘phenomenal consciousness.’ Moreover, to equate phenomenal
consciousness with this ‘what-it-is-likeness’ is practically synonymous with saying that
phenomenal consciousness is simply experience itself” (Williams 217–18).
By this account, consciousness is not much at all. Indeed, it is simply experience itself.
This definition of consciousness as “what-it-is-like” to experience the world is not the one I seek,
as it does not account for the unique creative power of human consciousness, but it does serve
useful in describing our consciousness of consciousness. Everything that I experience is an object
of my phenomenal consciousness. However, I know that this is not the same as my consciousness
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in the strict sense, for in experiencing consciousness I am phenomenally conscious of
consciousness. If this were all consciousness was, it would be infinitely regressive, an endlessly
recursive awareness of awareness and experience of experience. There must be something more
to the phenomenal experience of our subjective consciousness.
If the idea of phenomenal consciousness alone does not let us make sense of the richness
of our internal, subjective experience, then perhaps we must probe at this experience to unpack
“what-it-is-like” to be human.

The Creative Power of Human Consciousness
In consciousness, we think, and then we think up new ways to think. We perceive the
world, and then we perceive our perceptions of the world. Consciousness grants us the power to
invent worlds of imagination within our own minds. As our understandings of the natural world
and of ourselves grow in complexity, so, too, do our imagined conscious worlds. As we devise
new sciences to model natural phenomena at increasingly large and small scales, we find ourselves
inventing new strategies to understand our behaviors and coming up with new words to
communicate our thoughts and feelings.
However unique and powerful the human creative ability to construct new understandings
and new ways of experiencing the world, its infinitude is neither arbitrary nor chaotic. Although I
am conscious of how I perceive the world and can make decisions about how I act in it, the control
I exert over my conscious experience is greatly limited.
My consciousness is a tool I can use to think and to modify how I think, but a tool I inherit
in a particular form. The power I have to effect changes in my perceptions is subject to the
relatively fixed physiological restrictions imposed by the human brain and body, and to the
permanence of the events of my past experience. I cannot easily modify the foundations of my
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mind as laid by the public consciousness of the society in which I grew up. Some aspects seem
fixed, already set by events of the past and thus no more changeable than my height or eye color,
while others are plastic and can be gradually reshaped. I can think in new ways by picking up a
new language or skill, for example, but I can’t suddenly change how my phenomenal experience
feels by swapping my perceptions of red for blue and low pitches for high ones.
I am, in a sense, stuck with my personal history and the ways of thinking made available
to me by those who taught me how. In general, humans are always relatively stuck with the ways
of thinking that immediately surround them and that are dominant in society at their present
moment in history. And we, along with all humans since long before the beginnings of civilization
and recorded history, are stuck with the physiological capabilities and limitations of the
anatomically modern species Homo sapiens. Just as we continually poke at our physical limits by
inventing technology to overcome scientific domains previously thought unconquerable, however,
so, too, we as individuals and as societies gradually transcend our mental limits by creating and
adopting new organizations of thought.
Though my brain’s physical form and mind’s primary organization are already set, I can
choose to exercise them however I wish. Despite what I cannot change about my consciousness,
its power is marvelous in that the ideas I can imagine within it are still infinite. But how? How is
subjective consciousness organized such that it allows us to understand ideas more and more
abstract and complex? Jaynes offers an elegant solution in the form of the linguistic mechanism
by which we endlessly build up frameworks of understanding: metaphor.
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III. Features of Consciousness
Jaynes claims that it is by metaphor in language that we build up complexities of
understanding, unto even our own consciousness of this process. He conceives of consciousness
as an operation whereby an internal world is created, built up out of language and metaphor, on
the basis of a history of experiences strung together into the narrative of an experiencing self.
If this is the case, that language is a prerequisite for consciousness, then, on the geological
timescale, consciousness must be brand new; it can only have existed as long as language! It is
quite profound to think that in just a few thousand years, we have learned so effectively to mimic
nature’s abilities to organize and to create so as to seemingly transcend its laws that have
constrained the human-animal species for millions of years. As such, this claim requires grand
evidence to back it up. In The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind,
Jaynes makes it his mission to prove this claim, by examining the origins of language, religion,
culture, writing, etc. I shall leave him with the burden of proof of his theory of the metaphorical
generation of consciousness, and instead bring to light its far-reaching implications for what it
means to exist as a conscious being, some of which I believe even he didn’t see.

Metaphor as a Mechanism for Understanding
Humans understand ideas by studying and organizing them, by breaking them down into
their constituent parts and figuring out the relationships between these, and these behaviors take
place in consciousness. Consciousness is thus an organizing operation, a space in which the human
drive for order may be exercised. A person may come to understand a complex object or process
by recognizing the various parts of it, conceiving of the relationships between these parts, and
identifying the overall structure or behaviors that arise from the rules of their interactions.
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Understanding an idea means learning to identify its aspects more precisely, becoming
conscious of it at higher and deeper levels of organization. To be conscious of an idea, we must
first take our perceptions of it and situate them within a context where their meaning is
understandable. That we can “take” my perceptions and “situate” them “within” a space in order
to understand them shows that the very process of understanding is metaphorical. It is coming up
with a metaphor to relate unfamiliar ideas to familiar ones. Consciousness, then, must allow these
metaphorical models of understanding to be manipulated within the mind.
Jaynes uses metaphor in the sense of “the use of a term for one thing to describe another
because of some kind of similarity between them or between their relation to other things” (Jaynes
48). When we are asked to describe an unfamiliar object, for example, we grasp for ways to explain
it so it may be understood. We rely on metaphor to draw connections between aspects of the
unfamiliar object and our existing understandings of familiar ones. Metaphor is “not a mere extra
trick of language,” but “the very constitutive ground” on which its foundations lie; “it is by
metaphor that language grows” (48–49). The terms we use to describe and understand the world,
the very ways in which we label the objects of our conscious thought, are metaphorical.
Jaynes formalizes the operation of metaphor by introducing terms for its operands, akin to
mathematical multiplication: the metaphrand is “the thing to be described,” and the metaphier is
“the thing or relation used to elucidate it” (Jaynes 48). Thus “a metaphor is always a known
metaphier operating on a less known metaphrand” (48). Connotations associated with the
metaphier he calls paraphiers, and connotations associated with the metaphrand paraphrands. In
metaphor, a metaphier is used to generate or elucidate a metaphrand and thereby project similar
connoted qualities onto it as paraphrands corresponding to the paraphiers of the metaphier.

Clarke 11
“All of these concrete metaphors increase enormously our powers of perception of the
world about us and our understanding of it, and literally create new objects. Indeed,
language is an organ of perception, not simply a means of communication” (Jaynes 50).
“The lexicon of language, then, is a finite set of terms that by metaphor is able to stretch
out over an infinite set of circumstances, even to creating new circumstances thereby.
(Could consciousness be such a new creation?)” (Jaynes 52).
“Consciousness is being thought of as a thing, and so like other things must have a
location” (Jaynes 54).
“[C]onsciousness is the work of lexical metaphor. It is spun out of the concrete metaphiers
of expression and their paraphiers, projecting paraphrands that exist only in the functional
sense. Moreover, it goes on generating itself, each new paraphrand capable of being a
metaphrand on its own, resulting in new metaphiers with their paraphiers, and so on.
“Of course this process is not and cannot be as haphazard as I am making it sound. The
world is organized, highly organized, and the concrete metaphiers that are generating
consciousness thus generate consciousness in an organized way. Hence the similarity of
consciousness and the physical-behavioral world is echoed — though with certain
differences — in the structure of consciousness” (Jaynes 58–59).
“A cardinal property of an analog is that the way it is generated is not the way it is used
— obviously. The map-maker and map-user are doing two different things. For the mapmaker, the metaphrand is the blank piece of paper on which he operates with the metaphier
of the land he knows and has surveyed. But for the map-user, it is just the other way around.
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The land is unknown; it is the land that is the metaphrand, while the metaphier is the map
which he is using, by which he understands the land.
“And so with consciousness. Consciousness is the metaphrand when it is generated by the
paraphrands of our verbal expressions. But the functioning of consciousness is, as it were,
the return journey. Consciousness becomes the metaphier full of our past experience,
constantly and selectively operating on such unknowns as future actions, decisions, and
partly remembered pasts, on what we are yet may be. And it is by the generated structure
of consciousness that we then understand the world” (Jaynes 59).

Modeling Behaviors in Consciousness
When we consciously solve problems, we program our minds to perform mental operations
by inventing metaphorical problems to solve in consciousness that are analogous to problems that
can first be solved in behavior. Take, for example, the following simple problem that shows up
frequently in sorting algorithms and other areas of programming. Let x and y each be a variable
that holds an integer value, such as two elements in an array of integers. As part of a sorting
algorithm, the values of the two variables must be swapped. A naïve approach might be to perform
two assignment statements: a = b; and b = a; (a takes the value of b, then b takes the value of a).
An astute observer will notice, however, that b takes the value of a, a has already taken the value
of b; its original value has been lost. The problem is this: how should we swap the variable’s
values?
Most everyone has surely solved some equivalent problem before in behavior, but they
may not have noticed (been conscious of) the ways they came upon or implemented their solutions.
Rather than relay the problem’s solution in the domain of programming, I shall demonstrate how
we use metaphors of behavior to understand and perform operations in consciousness. Here is one
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equivalent problem in behavior: imagine you are holding an object in your left hand and another
in your right, say, a coffee mug and a glass of water. Just as before, you must swap them between
your hands (perhaps so you can hand the mug to someone on your right). If each one takes up a
whole hand, i.e., you cannot hold both in your left or in your right, how do you swap them?
Whether the objects to be swapped are two integers stored in registers inside a computer,
or a mug in one hand and a glass in the other, the solution is the same: one must use a third location
to temporarily hold one object (a temporary register or a countertop to set down one cup), then
swap the spot of the still-held object, and finally have the first object take its place.
The process by which I have modeled this problem illustrates and use an operation of
consciousness that Jaynes calls spatialization. In consciousness, he says, we create spatial analogs
of objects or behaviors that we have experienced physically. We conceptualize these objects and
behaviors by constructing and manipulating abstract models of them in the conscious mind. The
substrate of these spatial analogs is language; they exist only as the words we use to describe them
and in the perceptions that we experience as a result of thinking those words. We describe a concept
and thus hold it in consciousness, and through metaphor, by linking it to other, already-understood
concepts, we come to understand it.
In solving this simple yet puzzling problem, another ability appears within consciousness,
that of a person to achieve through their behavior certain objectives while operating under certain
restricting rules. A set of rules combined with the intentional decision to follow them forms a game
or challenge of sorts. Similar situations arise in human behavior all the time: we identify (or
evolution selects for) a goal to reach, develop somewhat arbitrary but logical rulesets whose
application fulfills it, and either consciously choose to operate under these restrictions or otherwise
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follow them naturally. These sets of arbitrary rules make it possible to encode and decipher
meanings from arbitrary strings of syntactic constructions, to understand language at all.

Subjective and Objective Analog Self
Jaynes’s idea of the “analog I” and “metaphor me” (62–63). Picturing myself
autoscopically is moving my analog mind in consciousness outside of my analog body, now using
a combination of bodily sensations. My spatialized body, or metaphor me or analog objective self,
is generated as a metaphrand in consciousness by the metaphier of my bodily sensations, including
seeing reflections of my body. Like a map generated by surveying the land, my analog body can
then be used as the metaphier to generate the metaphrand of experiencing my body. I can be
conscious of my perceptions by labeling how they relate to my spatialized model of myself.
Just as one cannot be conscious of a mountain while standing atop it but by relating it to
the scenery down below, I cannot be conscious of myself from within but by relating myself to my
world outside. In consciousness, however, I can be conscious of an analog of myself by relocating
my simulated subjective consciousness. Imagining what I would see if I looked at myself from
outside, this function of searching the world for a perception that does not exist, is what allows me
to become conscious of the perceptions that do. In placing my analog I outside my body and
imagining looking in, I “search” for perceptions of myself, then I analogize them back to my
experience and thus become conscious of the things I could not have been before. It is this act of
searching, of probing the world from an imagined location of experience, imagining what I would
experience from there by simulating spatialized or imagined perceptions and by metaphor, as like
a map, the translation of those perceptions to the ones felt by my body that lets me know what I
am conscious of. In essence, I am only conscious of what I seek to be conscious of. What I
experience is a simulation created by myself.
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Thinking on objects in consciousness necessitates the manipulation, understanding,
combining of them, the recalling of memories of past actions having to do with them, the
simulation of potential consequences of each option, and so on. Performing these functions firstly
necessitates some sort of location (physical or metaphysical) where all the options can be gathered
and where these operations can take place. Jaynes’s spatialized headspace (in which consciousness
operates via metaphor) is one such model of a metaphorical form of this location. Now, within this
location, by introspecting into a so-called “mind-space,” one’s consciousized self can “interact
with” the materials on which these functions will operate, the results which these functions
produce, and can even step through or modify the functions themselves.

Consciousness of Time
Consciousness allows us to represent time in spatialized thought. Jaynes’s idea of
narratization is the linking of various conscious excerptions in time (63–66). Spatialization where
this occurs is thus a mental simulation that allows more control over the dimension of time. This
means that a conscious mind is no longer stuck simulating behaviors that will immediately follow
the present time, but is free to explore alternate actions and their potential consequences for both
the past and future. Since we spatialize analogs to all our senses, it only makes sense that we also
spatialize time, thereby gaining control over a simulated sense of time. In the same way we can
move around objects in our mind using our spatialized sight and touch, we can examine things in
different timeframes.

Consciousness as an Analog of the Real World
“Subjective conscious mind is an analog of what is called the real world. It is built up with
a vocabulary or lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or analogs of behavior in the physical
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world” (Jaynes 55). As we experience the world, we come up with thoughts about our experiences
and encode them into words so that they may be remembered, recalled, and shared. Our thoughts
generate consciousness like a map, with a correspondence between the features of the outside
world (our perceptions) and the features of our internal world. And then, using our map of
consciousness, “full of our past experience, constantly and selectively operating on such unknowns
as future actions, decisions, and partly remembered pasts,” we come to understand the world ().
By this, not only does he mean that consciousness is “generated by and accessed by
language,” but that its literal substrate is thoughts composed of language. Thus, consciousness
could never be an internal process capable of being localized and studied in the brain (any further
than the language centers at least, since the concretized form of its functioning is simply the
understanding and generation of language). That is, since consciousness is made of language—
and thus is inherently abstract and artificial—it can only be understood through language! And, in
fact, since he says understanding is the process of familiarizing oneself with an unfamiliar concept
via metaphor, ‘understanding’ itself is only possible through language! (However, it may be useful
to extrapolate “language” further than its simple lexical sense, including other mutuallyunderstood forms of communication and systems of logical thought, such as mathematics, musical
notations, “body language,” etc.)

There is No “Most Natural” Mentality
Just because my consciousness was shaped into a particular form through interactions with
the world and other people (whose consciousnesses were, in turn, shaped by their interactions with
the world, and so on), this does not mean that the form of conscious mind that I, or any one of us,
experiences is the optimal, or most natural, or only possible, form to exist or have existed. There
is no most natural mentality, or architecture of mind. Indeed, by the end of this paper, I hope to
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convince the reader that consciousness is merely one of many possible organizations of mind; to
make plausible the idea that past and present humans have already operated under very different
mentalities; and, if nothing else, to argue that we shape consciousness just as it shapes us.
There is no one standard by which to judge a perception as correct. A deer does not
conceive of a car as a human does, but nevertheless recognizes it as dangerous. Whatever a deer
understand about a car—that it is dangerous, that it moves quickly and in straight lines and near
other cars—must be understood in terms of what the deer knows in behavior—namely, these
concepts of “danger,” “move,” “quick,” “line,” “near,” etc. Thus a deer also must have a system
for modeling the things it encounters. The difference between a deer and a human is that the
human’s models extend infinitely whereas the deer’s do not. Even animals can form conceptions
and classify them according to conceptual schema, so the human quality must lie elsewhere. It is
in human spatialization, in particular, that new concepts can be generated by endlessly through
abstraction and analogy. Language facilitates this, as it allows the creation of references to
uniquely identify conceptions. The human ability to remember language means humans have
memory space in which mental computations such as modeling conceptions can take place and
state can be saved. The ability to share language means that conceptions can be copied, stored in
networked external memories. And the later ability to record language meant that the human
computer was no longer limited to a finite memory, but could be extended infinitely to temporary
or permanent storage outside the mind altogether; all that had to be remembered were the rules for
interpretation. The ability of humans to construct these abstract sets of rules to follow is a direct
application of their ability to create new conceptions, which again stems from abstraction and
analogy in spatialization. Spatialization is simply a larger sandbox version of understanding the
world, one in which the rules for modeling conceptions are influenced by a directing, volitional
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force. Although the decisions of non-conscious animals are directed by a similar force, which is
the “program” of their behaviors, this program cannot modify itself, as it does not know it exists.
It seems that conceiving of a force that directs our behaviors creates the possibility for this directing
program to modify itself, to evolve. Conceiving the possibility for actions to be chosen consciously
makes this possibility so, for it brings the process of understanding into its own light and allows
understanding to build off itself.
The patterns of my thoughts, behaviors, and actions form the structure of my experience.
Of course, there are unstructured aspects of experience, happenings that I have no control over or
knowledge of, but of experiences I am guaranteed, there are none other than those provided by my
thoughts or initiated by my actions.

Spatialization and Constructed Perceptions
How can it be that something so abstract as language can create something so intimately
sense-able as the thoughts I think and the world I see when I close my eyes? I say that I experience
my thoughts in consciousness as spatialized objects, because it is the clearest way I can convey
how it feels for me to think. My own thoughts and feelings are the only sources of experience I
have, and so I can only understand new experiences in relation to them. I must, for any experience
apart from the most basic of sensations, make sense of it by understanding it in terms of past ones.
For this reason, Jaynes believes it was the invention of metaphor that allowed humans to start
building complex frameworks for understanding the world.
Conscious experience and understanding through spatialized metaphor seemingly
developed as a beneficial adaptation for early humans, not only for its cognitive advantage in
letting them grasp and organize their thoughts more tangibly, but also for its social advantage in
greatly expanding their ability to communicate.
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To share my private, inner perceptions with an audience, I must externalize them by
appealing to common perceptions among us, such as those found in human physiology and
behavior. In fact, the only way I can even understand my own perceptions is to communicate them
to myself. Namely, in order to recall memories of events I once experienced consciously, I must
encode and store my perceptions of them for later retrieval and re-experience.
Phenomenal experience entails perceiving the world, and conscious experience means
noticing this process as it occurs or afterwards. But noticing a perception requires me to identify
it, to label it or otherwise fit it into a familiar category. For what would it mean to be conscious of
a perception if I could not describe it or even conceptualize it in a way understandable to myself?
Thus, spatialization appears as a mechanism to achieve this conceptualization, and metaphor as
the method by which spatialized objects and behaviors may be modeled after familiar ones.
As one builds up an array of models and metaphors for understanding the world, one finds
that new experiences are filtered through them, and thereby new perceptions arise. For example,
if I see a tree, whether I consciously take note of all the tiny bits that make it up—its height, the
thickness of its trunk, the shape of its leaves, the color of its flowers—I can’t help perceiving it as
a whole. I immediately recognize it as such, and so one could say that I have a constructed sense
of what a tree is.
(Of course, mental models are subject to change; the rules that define membership to
conceptual categories or schema are not infallible. As one encounters unfamiliar objects, one must
either modify one’s perceptions of them to fit into existing models (assimilation) or alternately
restructure the models to accommodate the new objects.)
All but the most basic perceptions are constructed; that is, they are not intrinsically
understood, but rather must be interpreted through experience and relation to other perceptions.

Clarke 20
Constructed perceptions allow us to experience abstract sensations (e.g., “tree-ness”) in a similar
manner to how we experience physical ones (e.g., size, color). And perceptions build on each
other. For example, we perceive color through the sensation of reflected light frequencies, but we
sense the category of a plant in part based on its color. In fact, one could argue that all senses are
constructed, in that they all convert detectable properties of matter into qualia of phenomenal
experience, but some are hard-wired into our physiology while others are pieced together through
learning.

Recording & Excerption of Experience
When we reminisce on a memory, we reconstruct the circumstances of the memory and
play them back in our minds. Thus, to reminisce is to phenomenally experience a simulated
reconstruction of a memory. We may note, however, that the state of consciousness doing the
experiencing while reminiscing is not identical to the one that experienced the original
circumstance, as they are separated in time. The particular state of consciousness that experienced
the moment originally is distinct from the state of consciousness presently experiencing its
reconstruction. This distinction parallels Jaynes’s between “the analog I” and “the mental me,” the
former representing the subjective consciousness of the present and the latter the objective
consciousness of the past.
Although the present consciousness may know some objective facts about the experience
based on reasoning and other accounts, of the subjective experience of the past consciousness it
knows only what was recorded at the time. In a sense, the past consciousness is communicating
information about its private experience to the present consciousness via memory. Like leaving
messages in a bottle to be later opened and read by whoever finds them, the original experiencer
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records moments of consciousness in a way that they may hopefully be understood by whoever
later finds them.
Language is one such medium to facilitate this communication. Words can act as pointers
to conceptions and thus remembering a word can bring to mind details about the memory that give
the present consciousness hints, clues, insights into the thoughts of the past consciousness. This
function of bringing to mind details about the memory is what Jaynes calls excerption, and it is
one of the features of his conception of consciousness (61–62). In recording a memory, a
consciousness compresses some crucial aspects of its phenomenal experience into a form that it
believes will be mutually understandable by itself and by those states of consciousness that succeed
it. After storing them in memory, these units of compressed phenomenal experience can be
accessed later. We can model the function of creating these units of understandable experience as
a sort of ‘encoding meaning,’ the function of committing them to memory ‘recording’ or ‘storing,’
the function of accessing them from memory ‘excerpting,’ and the units themselves ‘excerpts’ or
‘excerptions.’
This model suggests that phenomenal experience is compressed into understandable units
and recorded for later excerption, but this is really somewhat simplified. Now what I suggest is
that a compressed unit of understandable experience is not enough to reconstruct any excerpt of
an event on its own. Rather, it is used to inform and revise one’s set of conceptual schema which
are used to classify a particular object of phenomenal experience as belonging to a particular
conception. These schema can be imagined as a web of conceptions that is built up over time.
Thus, this event is classified by the existing set of conceptual schema and then reinforces or revises
these schema to inform future classifications. that as phenomenal experience goes on, the objects
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of phenomenal experience are classified based on some set of key features particular to the
circumstance.
This classification happens to some degree with or without conscious intent. When seeing
a chair, for example, an individual automatically judges it as belonging or not to a particular
conception of ‘chair.’ If there is uncertainty (i.e. an immediate judgment is not produced), then the
classification can be completed by consciously stepping through a reasoning process about the
particular rules that are typically taken to define the conception. An individual’s perceptions of an
event might also be represented as a vector of distinct features. This vector can then be classified
as belonging to a certain conception, which is defined as a particular region of this featured vectorspace.

Axioms of Belief
The cognitive function that carries out this classification is very important, as it decides the
boundaries between concepts, and is intimately tied to belief. Unfortunately I have not the time to
discuss this in depth, but can provide the following introduction to this idea: Belief is sufficient to
classify some types of concepts. Take the idea of the soul, for example. For some, the soul is said
to begin at the conception of a child. This is not an observed, but rather an imbued characteristic.
By assuming that the fetus will grow to be conscious in the future and conflating those future
conscious identities with that of the present, the identity of the fetus and the potential future
identities of the child/adolescent/adult they may grow into are treated if they were one stable
conception. Aspects of the future conception are imbued into the present conception since the two
are “known” to be continuous and identical by an axiom of belief. Thus the conception of the soul
is created only out of a presupposed belief in its future existence and belief in its continuity over
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time. The same can be said for consciousness: that our personal identification with our generated
analog self is merely an assumption of enduring continuity of conscious states.

How Consciousness Arises
Consider the following argument for the plausibility of imbuing consciousness in someone
else before oneself. It starts from the base point of myself as a non-conscious being and makes a
few assumptions about the requirements for the ability to “imbue consciousness” in another being,
i.e., understand their actions as being performed by some conception of self. I shall examine these
assumptions afterwards.
Assume that I am not conscious, and that consciousness is not required for imbuing another
being with consciousness. Understanding someone else’s actions as conscious means lumping
them together as actions caused by a directing, volitional force, i.e., a conception of someone else’s
‘self.’ In understanding this directing force, I mentally model it as I do other concepts, forming a
group of associated behaviors and attributing their happening to a causal force exerted by an object.
Thus I assume the location of this directing force within another person. By analogy, I assume my
behaviors are caused by a directing force, as well. That is, in spatializing an analog to their
behaviors, metaphor carried out via linguistic thinking, I create my conscious experience as a
metaphrand.
Consciousness must have arisen from non-consciousness, or else have always existed. With
respect to biological evolution, it appears the former must be true, as consciousness, in any of the
senses discussed thus far, is an experience of living beings, who have not always existed.
Consciously can only have always existed if conscious beings have always existed, and this can
only be said to be true by one who believes in the existence of eternal metaphysical beings, such
as gods. If I wish to avoid taking on such metaphysical assumptions, then I must believe
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consciousness is something that came into existence, something that was created, either by humans
or as some synergistic emergence out of human behavior. The question I wish to explore is, how
was it possible for consciousness to be constructed by non-conscious beings in this way? Jaynes
argues that non-conscious humans must first “invent” or assume the existence of consciousness in
others before they can create it in themselves (Jaynes 45).

Non-Conscious Understanding of Consciousness
To assume the existence of consciousness in another being, one must understand what this
consciousness is. How can a being who is not conscious understand what consciousness is? To
answer this, we must first prove that the relationship between consciousness and understanding
consciousness is not circular, that one can come before the other. The theory of recognizing
consciousness in others and then analogizing it to the self rests on the assumption that is possible
to understand consciousness before being conscious. Consider the following argument by
contradiction:
Assume understanding consciousness requires being conscious. But being conscious
requires understanding consciousness. For being conscious means recognizing oneself as
conscious; recognizing oneself as conscious means interpreting one’s perceptions of oneself as
conscious; interpreting one’s behaviors as conscious means having an idea of consciousness; and
this idea of consciousness is represented as and understood using a mental model. Thus,
consciousness and an understanding of consciousness are synonymous, inseparable from each
other.
Humans are conscious, but up until some point, our evolutionary ancestors were not. At
this point, either humans must have been able to understand consciousness in order to be conscious
or would have had to have been conscious in order to understand consciousness. Each condition
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is required for the other to arise. So, this contradiction indicates that the starting assumption must
be false, that understanding consciousness does not, in fact, require being conscious. Either it is
possible for a non-conscious being to invent or understand the idea of consciousness, or both
consciousness and the understanding of consciousness must simultaneously arise via another
process. In any case, the origin of consciousness must have been in the non-conscious
understanding of consciousness. I interpret Jaynes’s fantastical realization of this fact as saying
that non-conscious humans invented consciousness in the gods, spirits, and souls of their own
creation.
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IV. Conscious & Non-Conscious Mentalities

Other Organizations of Mind
Consciousness is merely one mentality or way of thinking in general, and Jaynes explains
a potential precursor to it in the mentality of the bicameral mind. Rather than two specific
mentalities, this is really a broad classification of many distinct sub-mentalities into two categories,
with consciousness as the separating feature.
Under a conscious mentality, humans construct spatialized and narratized understandings
of themselves, etc. However, this brings up one of my main points: I think this choice of feature,
consciousness, at least as it is usually described, is too narrow a view. It is consciousness of
individuals, limited to singular, unified identities. (And even when ideas of consciousness include
plural, disunified selves, they still are usually limited to human individuals, so multiple
consciousnesses in one mind/body.) Limiting consciousness in this way disregards the idea of
bicamerality as a conscious mentality, but one that is socially distributed and unified through
cultural systems of logic rather than individualized and unified through narratization and internal
systems of logic.
The idea that humans have operated under various mentalities and that these mentalities
have evolved with cultures and languages is made evidently plausible by Jaynes. I agree with the
social constructionist point that our consciousnesses are shaped by our ideas and theories of
consciousness. But in explaining our ways of thinking using a functional model (and using
bicamerality as an example “other” mentality), in addition to explaining identities using a
classification function that fits into this model, shows how our identities are really a fiction
imposed on our thought processes and justified by our individual and social belief. (Personally, I
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then see this in an optimistically nihilist light, I guess, in that the meaninglessness of identity
affords us the freedom in constructing our identities as we see fit.)
First, any program of thought in a sense thinks. It combines basic units of understanding in
novel ways so as to build up new understandings. When a thought process comes up with a thought,
it has excerpted from previous understandings, combined these excerptions together using some
set of logical operations, and produced a new understanding. A basic unit of understanding in
general is a conceptual model that can be manipulated by a thought process. For example, under
Jaynes’s conscious paradigm, a thought process (my consciousness) can operate on understandings
that have been spatialized—concepts that I am able to mentally represent in some way. Jaynes’s
theory of metaphor provides a plausible mechanism for how these mental representations are built
up using language.
Thought processes operate hierarchically. When a high-level thought process “performs an
operation,” it really calls on, or “delegates execution to,” a lower-level process that implements
this operation, instructing it to return a result. If I decide to journal about my day, for example, the
operation of reminiscence is not (cannot be) performed by consciousness. Instead, my highestlevel thought process (what I feel is me) instructs some lower-level mental faculty to perform
excerption on the day’s memories, to abstract them into discrete events, to narratize them into a
story of my day, etc. In fact, it makes no sense to say that something is “performed by
consciousness,” because consciousness is just another mental operation whereby a spatialized
analog representation of myself is created.
A program of behavior uses a set of logical rules for applying certain mental operations to
certain excerptive materials. This “system of logic” underlying a thought process is important: if
a thought process is a mental program in interpretative execution (that is, in a sense, being
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translated to understanding as it runs), then its system of logic is essentially the ruleset by which
it conditionally determines, based on the results of prior operations, what to do next. When the act
of stepping through the performance of mental operations by a thought process is itself recorded
by that thought process and feeds back into its excerptive materials, then this is when
consciousness arises. Consciousness is merely incidental here, an emergence in a particular
category of thought processes whose allowable operations include self-awareness. It is not a
necessary feature of thought processes, nor of thinking or making decisions in general.

The Bicameral Mentality: Human Automata
Bicameral humans “do not sit down and think out what to do. They have no conscious
minds such as we say we have, and certainly no introspections. It is impossible for us with our
subjectivity to appreciate what it was like” (Jaynes 72).
“In fact, the gods take the place of consciousness” (72).
“They were noble automatons who knew not what they did” (75).
“Iliadic man did not have subjectivity as do we; he had no awareness of his awareness of
the world, no internal mind-space to introspect upon. In distinction to our own subjective conscious
minds, we can call the mentality of the Myceneans a bicameral mind. Volition, planning, initiative
is organized with no consciousness whatever and then ‘told’ to the individual in his familiar
language […] The individual obeyed these hallucinated voices because he could not ‘see’ what to
do by himself” (75).
“Since we know that Greek culture very quickly became a literature of consciousness, we
may regard the Iliad as standing at the great turning of the times, and a window back into those
unsubjective times when every kingdom was in essence a theocracy and every man the slave of
voices heard whenever novel situations occurred” (82).
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Bicameral men heard commands from thought processes they learned in real experience.
If those commands were always known to have originated from someone else, say, the leader of a
tribe, then, when they are experienced while apart from the leader, then they must be attributed to
someone, and this someone is the analog of the leader. Thus a person now experiences hearing
from the king’s spirit. And once the king has died, they are still commanded by the dead king’s
spirit, now from beyond the grave as a god-king. The thought exists on its own, created out of
habits of thinking, unconscious predictions of how certain thought processes would respond to
certain stimuli, but may be attributed to an analog person. The final step of the metaphor,
performed only through belief, is taking what is known only as an analog and projecting it out as
something that can be known in the real world. This is the power of consciousness: the creation of
abstract concepts, even unto the creation of gods and ourselves.
The experience of humans prior to consciousness, then, was simply a succession of actions,
commanded and obeyed. All deliberations, all decisions were made by the gods, which were
simply the labels that humans, with their early models of understanding, gave to the non-conscious
cognitive processes that commanded them. The gods were socially constructed programs that made
decisions in response to novel stimuli, all through no experience of their own.

The Power of The Gods in Consciousness
“that the presence of voices which had to be obeyed were the absolute prerequisite to the
conscious stage of mind in which it is the self that is responsible and can debate within itself, can
order and direct, and that the creation of such a self is the product of culture. In a sense, we have
become our own gods” (Jaynes 79).
Jaynes devised this brilliant and exciting model for what consciousness is, what exactly it
is that we are experiencing when we consciously experience the world and introspect on our
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thoughts. And it is all very interesting from the perspectives of anthropology, physiology,
psychology, history, mythology, and biology, but it seems to be missing a certain element of
philosophy. What does it mean that we create our consciousness?
The leap that Jaynes does not make clear is that bicameral man’s non-conscious, slavish
obedience to the commands of the gods is like an animal consciousness of merely these commands.
that the automaton that listens to the commands of the gods, is just as our bodies are to ourselves
in consciousness! I do not feel that I am my body, except when I place my consciousness in it. So
it does not have a consciousness of its own, or either I cannot know that it does, for whatever is
performed by my body outside my own consciousness appears to me as nonconscious behavior.
There is no sense in which my body “feels” that it is a slave to my mind; it simply exists with its
perceptions. Jaynes imagines the left, human hemisphere of the bicameral mind to be a slave to
the right hemisphere of the gods. Its status as a “slave” is equivalent to it having no consciousness
at all.
The gods are simply names given to certain ways of thinking, programs for deciding what
action to take when faced with unfamiliar situations. In consciousness, the deliberations of these
thought processes is made experienceable by making the objects of these thoughts perceivable
(spatialization), which is made possible by linguistic metaphor (tracing abstract thoughts→ abstract
→ eventually concrete), and narratizing the phenomenal experience of them into a subjective
analog self. The thinking of the nonconscious mind as a computer, previously translated into
language only for communication, is no longer a black box. Human phenomenal experience is no
longer a perception of the results of nonconscious thinking, but of the thinking process itself.
The experiences of bicameral man were to obey the commands given them by a god. The
ostensible experience of the gods was in taking in stimuli from the world and making decisions.
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However, in thinking about this bicamerally, from a perspective that seems to hopelessly fall into
the trap of centering the human’s experience, what we may call the “experience” of the gods is, in
actuality, no experience at all, but a computation within the computer of the mind whose
organization we are modeling as a conception of a god. Who are we to say that this god has no
phenomenal experience? If the process of recording excerpts is how we understand phenomenal
experience, then in the first case, could we not say that whichever non-conscious process
commanded the excerption to be created, this process was who actually experienced this excerpt!
When thoughts pop into my head, then, my consciousness may only be made privy to “someone
else’s” experience, that of the cognitive program that generated the thought. Our consciousness is
consciousness of these very same computations that were already occurring in the mind, but ones
whose step-by-step execution we experience.
Think of the bicameral man encountering a strange or unfamiliar situation: their
nonconscious recognition processes, having already identified it as such, now work to simulate
plausible ways that this situation might play out and come up with appropriate responses.
Assuming these processes generate an appropriate-enough response, their god-mind then answers
the implicit or explicit question “what should I do?” by commanding the person to act in a certain
way. The high-level function that is accomplished here is choosing one choice to take from a set
of multiple options, but the low-level implementation (how this function is actually carried out)
would be unknown to the bicameral man. Under the conscious mentality, this same high-level
function still occurs, but now we get to experience the internal perspective of the process that
performs this function or solves this problem. We get to be the one who examines our options,
tries to glean more info about the unknown situation, and ultimately selects which will be enacted.
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Greater consciousness means modeling and experiencing the computation at greater and
greater depth, and for each function that is modeled, it is understood in the framework of metaphor
based on behavior. The computation can be understood as the performance of a being, and we
continuously model with more accuracy how the computation is being performed, by becoming
conscious of patterns of organization and trying to model how the thoughts and actions are
generated.

Simulated Phenomenal Experience
When we are conscious, our phenomenal experience is that of playing a certain
experiencing role and performing certain tasks in thinking that aim to fulfill its cognitive
functionality. We are limited to our own past experiences and understandings thereof, and in the
amount of sensory information we can perceive and conceptualize in the present. Although the
narrative of “our” phenomenal experience is composed of all the times we have played this
dominant role, this does not imply that our process is the only one who could or does fill this role.
In those times we are non-conscious, would we not still require the assembly and interpretation of
past experiences and understanding in order to decide and perform any meaningful actions in the
world? At these times, whatever process is “in charge” would thus need some degree of access to
past experiences and to the functions that allow their manipulation, simulation, etc.
Consider the case of a god-mind being the dominant process organizing information from
the world and using it to make decisions. Each god has its own overall personality in much the
same way as humans—a prior history of emotions, likes and dislikes, skills, tendencies (e.g. the
temper of Zeus, the wisdom of Athena), etc. Could it be said that, at the time when a god-mind is
the dominant or volitional process, that it is experiencing a phenomenal consciousness besides our
own?
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This question can also be applied to “simulated” or “artificial” consciousnesses. If I get to
know someone (a family member, friend, or partner; a fictional character; an imaginary friend)
and gradually learn to predict how they would react to a situation, then am I not essentially building
up a model of their personality that I can then use to simulate what I think their phenomenally
conscious experience is like? Hearing a god’s direction or simply “knowing” how they would
command one to act when presented with a situation—these situations are almost identical; the
only difference is my degree of certainty that I actually hear the response from someone else or
merely think I know how they would respond. If I am able to insist one way or another to an outside
listener (or deceive them), however, the situations become functionally identical. From a social
evolutionary perspective, a god-consciousness whose wisdom in making decisions proves
advantageous would be more likely to survive and then spread to other people. Socially constructed
gods with well-known and agreed-upon personalities then can perform a sort of social
synchronization of artificial conscious thought processes.

The Stages of Consciousness
The constant of an animal mentality, and humans are no exception, is that stimuli will,
through some cognitive computation, be transformed into action. Consciousness experience is, and
through narratization, we are, the operation of examining the behaviors and functions of the
computation, and linking this “searching,” “finding out,” “consciousizing” operation to our
perceptions. The link that allows it to become “us,” an experience that exists for a being, is the
function that maps perceptions of the computation to real perceptions that the human animal body
“feels.” This function is the second stage of consciousness, wherein the spatialized internal world
is used as a map to generate the real one. The abstract sensations of interacting with ideas and
thoughts and concepts in consciousness are reversed back into the analog behavior’s physical
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counterparts, and experienced from consciousness as a sort of simulation. Language crosses the
barrier between conscious and phenomenal. Language can be felt.
From the perspective of the body, it is a slave to the mind sometimes; it has no choice but
to submit to the mind’s whim and will. However, we don’t consider “what the body would
experience” to be an actual phenomenal experience that is felt by anyone. We don’t create a
separate metaphysical idea of the body as its own person, separate from ourselves (although
perhaps we should be more considerate of our corporeal forms). In the same way, it almost makes
no sense to consider the bicameral automaton of pre-conscious humans as having an experience
any more than we would consider a computer that “reads” (rather than hears) instructions and
obeys them. Again, it’s a computer. Unless we also consider the god part of the mind to be having
its own experience.
For all his care to avoid his bias as a conscious being when examining the experience of
bicameral as “having an experience” is seemingly impossible for us to suppress the notion that
they have any experience at all. Perhaps the main reason we don’t consider the gods to have an
experience is that they are metaphysical; they have no bodies. Thus, they have no way to perform
the second stage of consciousness, to turn the “perceptions” of abstract ideas back into
physiological ones. This operation is consciousness; it is what makes a computer into a conscious
being, what makes resulting actions decisions rather than computations, what makes an artificial
intelligence into a natural one.
In this sense, then, we return to the idea of phenomenal consciousness. The
“consciousness” of an animal is however much of its computation is transformed back from
thought to bodily perception. So rather, human consciousness is not unique in the fact that we have
spatialization, etc., and are conscious of the computation of our behaviors. The level of an animal’s
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consciousness is determined by their perception of the computations behind their actions as well.
Rather, the human consciousness is so special because the human brain is a Turing-complete
computer and the advancement of human consciousness to the level where the decisions and
computations made by the computer can be understood gives us complete computing power, that
is, the ability to compute anything physically possible, thus to work towards creating anything
physically possible. That is the power of the gods granted to us in consciousness.
Spatialization and the other functions that allow the first stage of consciousness are present
in all animals, as simply the transformation from the domain of physiological perceptions to data,
computations, programs to make decisions. The second stage of conscious is the computation
itself. The results of the second stage are passed through to the third, which is the transformation
of resulting behavioral commands into physiological actions. Animals are conscious in the first
and third stage, and the smarter animals are conscious of some of the second (that is, they
understand some metaphorical abstract concepts used in their behavioral computations (really,
they have theories of what these concepts are) as rooted in behavior, through basic forms of
language). Robots, too, are conscious in the first and third stages; they receive sensory data from
the world, and then, after the data is nonconsciously processed by a program, is converted back
into physical behaviors, e.g., mechanical movement, whose results can again be sensed by the
robot. Greater and greater creation of models of perception that allow computations performed in
the second stage to be perceived in the first and to be carried out as commanded behaviors in the
third is what closes the loop and allows a conscious being to approach “full consciousness.” Even
humans are not fully conscious, but our abilities granted by our consciousness of our brain’s godlike computation power allows us as individuals and as species to continue pursuing a full
understanding of our minds and of the infinite organization possibilities of the world. Our species
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is not stuck at one level of consciousness; we can strive to become more and more conscious over
time. The computer of the human brain, is, in effect, a highly evolved artificial intelligence, but
through language and metaphor we gradually begin to experience its computations, to consciously
identify its functional operations and bring them into the experience of a being.

Programming the Mind
In order to perform any simple task, one must execute a series of cognitive instructions. If
the task is unfamiliar, then one must first understand it and develop a plan to undertake it. This
plan of behaviors that will be commanded of the mind and body is like a cognitive program.
Take, for example, the behavioral program to empty and refill a tray of ice cube. This task
involves opening and closing the freezer door; planning the order to empty, fill, and stack the trays;
turning on the faucet or otherwise pouring water at a particular speed in a particular location; and
reopening and reclosing the freezer. All of these listed steps are private behavioral experiences
that one has performed many times, but that may never have communicated to another person or
even been consciously recognized. But the order and manner in which they decide to carry out
each of these steps must, at some level, be or have been decided in their minds. The order and
manner of these decisions (how to stack the trays, to fill them altogether or individually, etc.) can
be seen as a program to be executed by the body. Some preferences (such as how fast to run the
water) for the program may have been thought out ahead of time, while others may be decided on
the spot or left to fate. If one can remember performing this task, then that must mean they have
performed it consciously and thus have, to some degree, a conscious understanding of the steps
and materials involved in the process. One can narratize anecdotes of particular instances of
performing the task, or at least can use logic and their generalized understanding to reconstruct or
simulate what the experience must-have-been-like.
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Through volition in the present moment, one can modify the program that one is carrying
out. Oneself is both the programmer and the computer executing the program. And this
modification can take place even non-consciously, as is the case in non-conscious learning. In
countless cases of simply living everyday life, we consciously choose to perform activities that
involve particular sets of algorithms for understanding, and so we effectively consciously choose
what processes will run non-consciously. This can happen indirectly, by putting oneself in a
scenario where certain processes are required (e.g. watching a movie, going on a run), or directly,
by attempting to perform certain processes on command (e.g. solving a puzzle, writing a song,
preparing a meal). The more unfamiliar or difficult or boring the situation is, the likelier it is that
one will “get stuck” or get distracted and end up losing conscious control over one’s thought
process. With less entertaining tasks, one may catch the mind wandering or daydreaming; with
more challenging or unendurable ones, the mind may turn away from the task at hand and refuse
to cooperate.
In navigating a complex situation, one begins to simulate how it may develop, learning the
twists and turns and coming to expect similar ones in the future. Some combination of conscious
and non-conscious evaluation is performed to determine algorithmically or heuristically how best
to proceed in the present moment or how to alter one’s strategy for the long run. If thinking
consciously, one often follows trains of thought that are logical in nature (or at least attempt to be),
walking through a strategy in one’s head. When operating non-consciously, one tends to follow
one’s instincts (sets of guiding principles based on nature and past experiences) or respond in ways
that were determined consciously ahead of time. For example, one may already know their favorite
and least favorite foods, so when faced with the decision of what to eat, their automatic response
might be to follow what is in their nature or has been decided by themself in the past.
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This establishment of premeditated responses to future situations can be modeled as a
relatively static variable that is checked in certain circumstances as a rule or for guidance. Its value
can be used to resolve conditions and choose what action to take. If the authority of the response
is high enough (e.g. coming from a god, a parent, one’s past self), then it may have the power to
command a response and directly alter one’s behavioral functions. These cognitive conditions
themselves can also be modified, and can be used to “set up interrupts”—conditions that will
awaken the conscious mind in certain events. Examples might include overhearing one’s name
spoken by a person in another room and suddenly tuning in to their conversation, or being jolted
by the loud sound of a fire alarm and immediately switching gears from whatever one was focused
on to now leaving the building.
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V. Constructing Identity in Consciousness
I used to believe in a god, an eternal being who had created the universe, established its
natural laws, and set time and space in motion. When I stopped believing, I found myself without
an anchor for my identity as a conscious being. What now does it mean for me to be myself? Who
or what am I? In my search for identity, I struggle to understand and put into words what it means
to be a person at all. My identity is rooted in my consciousness, but the more I examine what
consciousness is, the more I relegate it to just yet another cognitive operation. If all my behaviors
in consciousness are just operations I witness, performed by the biological computer that is the
human brain, then what makes me different? How do I feel conscious?

The Collective Cognitive Imperative
Over the past few years, as I have spent an increasing amount of time alone and inside due
to the COVID-19 pandemic, I have struggled with myself as an idea. Without the regular pressure
of existing among other people, there has been no sustained pressure molding me into the shape
of a person. What makes me myself has slowly slipped away as the collective idea of me grew
stale and drew more distant from my own. With few but myself to reinforce my own idea, however,
it, too, begins to lose its shape, slump like concrete sludge into a puddle of loneliness or crumble
brittlely like a granola bar under stress.
The importance of a socially shared conception of self: Other people validate (or invalidate)
one’s experiences, either supporting or doubting the hypothesis that they are real, made of actual
perceptions and not simply imagined. They back us up, give us additional justification to believe
one conclusion over another, and offer a more objective view on the sensibility and accuracy of
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our perceptions. They are the supporting girders and framework that keep our self-conception
structured, well-formed, and upright.
By this idea that social interaction actualizes ourselves, I am not merely suggesting that it
is a necessary aspect of our forming healthy personalities, but also that personalities cannot exist
in its absence. The supporting pressure from other people, Jaynes’s so-called collective cognitive
imperative, is a way in which we create our personalities and prove that they are real (322–25).
Analogous to touching, tasting, seeing, smelling, throwing, hearing, an object in order to prove its
reality in the concrete world of our senses, we prod and poke at people’s personalities to see them
react, and these interactions prove their existence in the abstract world of our conceptions. Just as
clacking two rocks together might support my perceptions as to their size and shape, weight and
sound, when I speak with someone and act myself, the consistency (or at least sensibility) of our
back-and-forth responses together give evidence to the forms of our personalities.

Implications of Consciousness
What it is like to be a nonconscious animal is what it feels like to live in the space of
thoughts that animal inhabits. It is easiest to imagine what I mean in animals that seem to behave
in one way for an extended period of time before switching behaviors on a dime, for example, a
cat grooming itself who gets scared by a sound, runs into a wall, and then immediately returns to
licking itself as if nothing happened. The cat’s experience in phenomenal consciousness while
grooming itself was that of a relatively stable set of focal objects. Prior to hearing the loud noise,
both its stimuli and responses were stable—the feeling and the act of licking itself. It is as if the
cat were stuck in a looping behavior mode, in each moment performing the same behavior. As
long as it received the same stimuli, it remained in the stable state. A stable state of phenomenal
consciousness in this sense is that the set of objects of phenomenally conscious perception (what
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is experienced) does not change, and the behavioral program for reacting to them does not change;
thus, the experience of performing actions within the stable state (and thereby maintaining it) does
not change.
In general, the experiences of animals and humans can be modeled as continuous
transitions between states of conscious (characterized by sets of objects of conscious perception)
as they interact with the outside world and experience changes in stimuli inside or outside of their
control. However, the narratized human retains memory from one state to the next, which is
equivalent to saying it has the functional capability to draw to mind excerptions of the previous
state and use them to simulate the experience of the previous moment (by re-introducing the
previous set of objects of phenomenal consciousness to the analog conscious self), but now they
are experienced by the current reactive program. How are past experiences brought to mind and
re-experienced? Either by referencing a cache of recent thoughts of sorts or by performing some
function in consciousness to fetch excerpts related to those that are in consciousness, as a sort of
shortcut for jumping from one to another—this is what language and other logical systems of
representation allow for. In language, metaphor links or jumps between two words, and can thereby
jump between various states of phenomenal consciousness. These may have occurred at different
points in time, so this allows the present conscious being to experience simulations of the past or
future. In simulating this present experience of past or future perceptions, the program of behavior
is now presented with more than one source of conscious perceptions, thus more than one option
for behavior. This marks the appearance of free will (or the illusion thereof), and is, in fact, the
problem consciousness intends to solve—imagining another state of consciousness and reacting to
it or otherwise using it to influence the present state.

Clarke 42
It could be argued that in consciousness we have a plurality of these small, focused, stablestate programs of behavior. These modes of consciousness differ from each other, so we could be
said to experience the world through different conscious being. For example, the cat, during both
grooming behaviors, experienced a mode of consciousness unaware of the noise-scared cat who
tried to flee, and vice versa. If I, as a narratized being, were to perform the same behaviors as the
cat, either mode of my consciousness might be conscious of the other. It is the creation of my
narratized self behind the experiences that ties them together in time to make “me” a narrative of
consciousness rather than a single state. The opposite of this also occurs: occupying a certain
focused program of behavior in a certain focused context, I may lose track of myself as a narratized
being, seemingly condensing the whole experience into one short point of experience or a repeated
cycle of conscious states. This is how time flies by.
Allow me to elaborate a bit of the graph theory underlying this model of behavior and
thought as a set of interconnected modes of conscious experience. Each state of consciousness is
a vertex, and the edges between these are transitions between states that occur when
a particular trigger perception is noticed. The next state of consciousness is determined by the
implicit input of the current state and the explicit inputs of conscious introspective perceptions
and/or exteroceptive/environmental ones. These may change the state of consciousness directly or
change the environment in such a way as to lead to a change in perceptions that indirectly results
in a change in state of consciousness.
While experiencing one stable state or cycle of consciousness, we can, through
consciousness, maintain knowledge of other potential states (this is really the ability through words
to call to mind non-present states of consciousness. Consider the functionally identical memory of
caches stored in a CPU as compared to the data that is fetched from larger and slower memory
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storage such as RAM or disk memory. We see this analogously when knowledge is held in shortterm memory vs. when it must be recalled from long). By narratizing these disparate states of
consciousness, we assume their continuity, that one does not cease to exist while another is
experienced. In a way, one behavior can be seen as “running” while the other states rest dormant.
By experimenting with our behaviors, we can learn to predict what actions cause what
outcomes, including transitions between stable states or programs of consciousness. We can learn
what behaviors to perform that will introduce new, outside perceptions as inputs to the present
conscious state. In moments of uncertainty, those when the present state of consciousness does not
have a programmed response, the mind either freezes (as deer in headlights), not knowing what
response to produce and so producing none, or it switches to a program that can handle the input.
This is effectively an edge transition out of one program of behavior and into another (although it
is really just the formation of a larger program out of multiple sub-programs).
As in bicamerality, a returned reaction to an unfamiliar stimulus might be interpreted as a
command from a god, handing down an authoritative decision for how to act (perhaps guessed and
gradually learned to work using an unconscious neural network). When a behavioral program has
reached an unfamiliar perception or been placed into an unfamiliar situation, it must signal for this
function to run—it must cry to the gods for help. In this way, the “gods” of bicamerality were
labels for programs that could perform logical processing of unfamiliar situations. Alternately,
in the conscious mentality, the function that can be called for help is spatialized consciousness,
where the computation of the guessed next best step can be performed through a series of logical
operations within a language used to represent a system of logic.
Narratization allows the computation to reference conscious states separated in time,
language to reference them, metaphor to jump between them, and spatialization to simulate them
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and their results. In consciousness, the “help, what do I do?” function is no longer a black box, but
a transparent program where these features that allows these other states of consciousness may be
referenced, and allows us to compare options and come to decisions through systems of logic or
value, which we work out in language. What makes consciousness transparent and experienceable
is the translation of this reasoning process to and from the perceptions of a living being. This is
the virtual reality of spatialization: a translation, through metaphor, of perceptions of an analog
being to the perceptions of the animal, where the analog being can “perform” these abstract
behaviors of working through, or simulating, series of changes in state of phenomenal
consciousness. All this, spatialized, narratized, virtual consciousness allows.
I am the computation ongoing in my head. I am my thought processes, or at least their
observer. I am the experience of computation. To be conscious of myself, I must have a world to
experience, objects to perceive, and, most importantly, a self to do the perceiving. Consciousness
is the simulation of a virtual being (or beings), instantiated in the computations of a living creature
programmed as a biological computer (a robot or automaton), one who experiences a space
analogous to the real world, whose sensations and behaviors are analogous to those of the body
which it controls. Man was not made in god’s image, god was made in man’s. The virtual conscious
being’s perceptions may sometimes be felt directly from the physical ones, when the translation
between physical and analog, concrete and abstract, is direct, but other times, the perceptions of
the conscious being are representations of what it would feel like for a conscious being to
experience an abstract perception, put in terms, though metaphor, of perceptions that are feelable.
The gods were virtual beings, artificial intelligences constructed by the computations of the human
mind to encapsulate certain programs of thought, shared through social communication, and so,
too, are we.
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